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CONTROL OF SUPER-POWER*
WILLIAM H. ROSE

t

Is the control of super-power 1 chiefly concerned with constitutional
law, with political theory, or with social economics? If with constitutional
law, what is its source? Should the giant combines of the electrical industry be left to govern themselves? Should the states control them? Can
they? Is their regulation a proper function for the federal government?
Such questions force themselves to the front in any consideration of
electrical power-supervision and assume increasing significance in the political and legal affairs of the day. Despite physical limits for economic transmission 2 the power industry has thrown off its swaddling clothes. It is no
longer merely a local prodigy. It has become a national phenomenon-international. As it grows its importance increases. Who shall direct its
ascendant power? Must we placate doctrine with soft words while we
advance the cause of centralization by clich6 and circumvention? If so, by
what means?
The public is taking its economics seriously. The price of electricity
affects the cost of living.

Its manufacture engages the public interest.

* For suggestive criticism in the preparation of this article, the writer expresses his appreciation to Professor Walton H. Hamilton of the Yale University School of Law.
tLL. B., 1924, M. A., 1929, Ohio State University; J. S. D., 1931, Yale University;
Assistant Professor of Law, Ohio State University Law School.
I "Super-power" has come to mean the interconnection of generating stations for a more
effective pooling and distribution of electrical power. It contemplates regional developments
of electrical distribution systems, and the manufacture of electricity at the source, both river
and mine. See: KYRwix, FEDERAL WATER-Powm LEGISLATION (1926) 23-27; PROSPERIry
THROUGH PowFa DEvEwOPMENT, excerpts from papers delivered at the First World Power
Conference held at London, England, July X924; Baum, National Superpower Scheme,
WoRLD, June 2, 1923.
EIcrmicAL
2
FEDERAI. PowiR CoMMIssIoN ANNUAL REPORT 1929, at 3, estimates the distance at 300
- miles. A recent invention may have increased the radius to 5oo miles. See SCIENCE NEWs
LETTER, July 11, 1931, at 21.
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"Giant Power." 3 "Generation at the source"-stream or mine. "Conservation of national resources." To the fathers of a nascent government
these were unknown terms. Coal lands passed early into private ownership,
4
and out of the sphere of governmental regulation-at least for the present.
More fortuitous circumstances attended the development of modem waterpower policy. Much of the stream-power is still within the supervision of
state or national governments. The problem of how this control is to be
effected, and so far as the federal governnent is concerned, of the constitutional mandates on which it rests, is not only for the present but for
the future to consider.
There are two topics for investigation. The first concerns the generation of hydro-electricity. The development of this phase is the story
of federal encroachment upon state jurisdiction over navigable rivers. 5 The
second deals with electricity as a commodity in inter-state commerce. As
such it loses its identity as a product and merges into a doctrine. It is in
this order that the discussion will proceed.
First, there is the Constitution. "We are told that it embodies the
delegation of federal powers by sovereign states beyond which the central
government may not go. 6 Yet should one be sanguine of so simple a solution? Is it not too much to hope that Benjamin Franklin's experiments with
kites could have forewarned his compatriots of the electrical development
which was to come, or of the distribution of electrical energy beyond state
lines which would sometime call for federal intervention? The Constitution
is not explicit. We search it in vain for the mention of super-power, electricity, or the allotment to states or the federal government of control over
its generation, transportation or rates.
But herein lies our thesis. Time and a tortuous journey are necessary
for a comprehensive view of changing doctrine. Bridges must be inspected
as well as dams. Gas cases must be metamorphosed, for super-power control did not spring "full-grown" but is an eclectic of court experience in
several lines of cases. The words of the Constitution are indelible, but social
needs and men's opinions change. New meanings are extracted from-or
more accurately-are given to dry verbalism. And although in the end the
intervention of the federal government in this field of paternalism must
receive a constitutional sanction, this is accomplished not by a formal perusal
'For a description of the term "giant power" see GIAINT POWER, the Report of the Giant
Power Survey Board of the Pennsylvania General Assembly.
'Federal regulation of the coal industry as a public utility was recently advocated by
Pittsburgh operators. See Pittsburgh Sun-Telegraph, Aug. 6, 193i, at z; LrI. DiG., Aug.
29, 1931, at 6.

'The first hydro-electric plant in the United States was built in

supra note I, at io6.

189o.

KmwiN, op. cit.

' See Marshall, C. J., in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, i Wheat. 304, 326 (U. S. 1816), and
in Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 187 (U. S. 1824); U. S. CONSTITUTION, Tenth Amendment; CooLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LImTATI S (7th ed. 19o3) Ii.
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of the instrument, but by reading into its language trends of political and
economic thought which have vitalized and rejuvenated its bare words.
The roots of the problem were planted early. Since the first days of
colonial settlements local governments have interested themselves in the
rgulation of water-power and 'navigation. In 1628 a water mill was constrtcted in Endicott's first colony.7 In 1629 legislative control of waterpower sites made its appearance in New Netherlands. 8 In 1638 the Massachusetts Colony passed legislation regarding the management of waterpower mills, and erected a government-owned sawmill. By that year
historical precedent had been established for governmental supervision of
water-power sources and mills, and for state ownership.9 In 1725 the
legislature of Pennsylvania provided for the erection of -dams, and the construction of bridges over navigable creeks and rivers. 10
After the Revolution state intervention became more pronounced. Ver12
mont prescribed for the use of power sites." New York regulated dams.
Other states joined the procession. 13 In 191o state attitude was voiced
at a convention of governors by a resolution which advocated "that all waterpowers should remain in the control and under the jurisdiction of the
respective states wherein such water-powers are situated." 14 In 1915 this
sentiment was even more vigorously resolved at the Western States Power
Conference.' 5
• The cause of such agitation was the steadily increasing congressional
intervention at the instance of conservationists in matters which concerned
navigation and power development.' 6 Prior to the Civil War congressional
policy seemed "to leave the regulation of navigable rivers, and in large
measure their improvement, to the several states, and to acquiesce in the
construction in such streams of whatever structures the State laws might
T

For a brief survey of historical background of the Federal Power Commission starting
with colonial times, see CONOVER, FEuERAL PowER ComMissioN (1923). See also, IKERwiN,
op. cit. supra note I; MEAD, WATER PowER ENGINEERING (2d ed. 1915) 14-16; WHTLOCK,
HISTORY OF THE CANAL SYSTEM OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK; AMROYD, A CONNECTED
VIEW OF THE WHOILE INTERNAL NAVIGATION OF THE UNITED STATES; PowELl, First
Canalsin American Continent (1910) 4 3. OF Am. HIST. 407-416.

8 Laws and Ordinances of New Netherlands, 1638-1674, p. 3 (citation from CoNovER,

op. cit. supra note 7, at 3).
'CONOVER, ibid. at 4.
" PA. STAT. AT LARGE (1722-1744) 35, PA. STAT. (West, i92O) §§ 6592, 6593.
"Laws of Gen. Ass. of Vt., June 1781 (cit. from CONOVER, op. cit. supra note 7, at 5).
'2Laws of New York, I8oi, p. 3oo; 1822, p. go; 1823, p. 132.
13 E. g.: Ill. Session Laws, 1824, p. ii; Me. Session Laws, 1834, pp. 592, 61o, 744; Oregon Session Laws, 1844, p. 86 (CONoVER, op. cit. supra note 7, at io) ; Laws of Territory of
Wisconsin, 1840, p. 34; MICH. CoNsTITUTION, 185o, art. XVIII, § 4.
2' CoNovm, op. cit. supra note 7, at 13.
-Resolved that "the states have the constitutional right and power to control and regulate the appropriation and usd of the waters within their boundaries for all beneficial purposes except navigation, and also the right and power to control and regulate the rates and
service of their public utilities." Hearings beford the House Committee on Water Power,
65th Cong. 2d Sess., at 478; CONOVER, op. cit. supra note 7, at 15.

" See IERWIN, op. cit. supra note I, c. 3-5; CONOVER, op. cit. supra note 7.
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authorize." 17 Federal participation in waterway improvements during this

period was chiefly limited to the making .of reports, surveys, loans and
land grants.' 8

After the War the government's attitude changed.'"

Com-

20
mencing with the act of June 26, 1866, a number of statutes were passed.

Federal control of water-power was lodged in three departments of government. The Department of War regulated water-power on navigable rivers;
the Department of Interior, water-power on public lands; and the Bureau
of Forestry in the Department of Agriculture, water-power in national forests.2 ' In 192o this distribution of administration was terminated, and the
control of the three Departments over water-power was centralized in the
Federal Water-Power Commission.2 2 The story of this progress toward

centralization in the supervision of hydro-electric generation, and the development of federal policy toward interstate transmission of electricity,
requires slower telling.
I
Federal control of inland waterways was not provided for in the Constitution. During the early days of the Republic legal opinion seems to
have conceded that federal jurisdiction over maritime matters was confined
to tide waters 2 3--a conception which was inherited from English law.

Taney had not yet repudiated this anacronism as applied to our vast expanse
of inland waters.2 4 Nor had legislative power over navigation been conceived
"'FE. PowER Comm. AxN. REP. 1921, at 47.
Ibid.
CoNovEa, op. cit. supra note 7, at i6 et seq.
14 STAT. 70 (i868), 33 U. S. C. A. § 6 (1928), granting rights-of-way to ditch and
canal owners over public lands. "Concurrently with the rivers and harbors act of 1884 Congress gave the first specific authorization (act of July 5i 1884, 23 STAT. 154) for the construction of a power project in a navigable stream. This authorization was followed in the
succeeding 22 years by a series of over 3o special acts which, except for the general provision
that they were subject to alteration, amendment, or repeal by subsequent act of Congress,
were perpetual in their term and were subject to no restrictions." FED. PowER Comm. ANN.
REP. 1921, at 48. For a discussion of the acts of i9o6 (34 STAT. 386 (1907), 33 U. S. C. A. c.
9n., p. 375 (928)), and i9io (36 STAT. 593 (0911), 33 U. S. C. A. c. 9 n., p. 375, and §421
(1928)) ; see FE. PowFR Comm. ibid., and 1CEtwiK, op. cit. supra note i, at 105 et seq.
"41 STAT. I063 (ig2o), 16 U. S. C. A. § 792 (1929). For a description of the movement
which preceded the creation of the commission, see CoNoVE, op. cit. supra note 7, at 47-62,
and KERWfN, op. cit. supra note I, at c. 3-5.
CoNovER, op. cit. supra note 7, at 24-46; 41 STAT. 1063 (1920), 16 U. S. C. A. § 792
(929).

The Steam-Boat Thomas Jefferson, io Wheat 428 (U. S. 1825) ; The Steamboat Orleans v. Phoebus, ii Pet. 175 (U. S. 1837). As a matter of fact the jurisdiction of vice admiralty courts in the colonies extended to fresh-water rivers. See ETNG, ADmmALTY
(1879) 25.
" "The language and decision of this court, whenever a question of admiralty jurisdiction
had come before it, seemed to imply that under the Constitution of the United States, the
jurisdiction was confined to tide-waters. Yet the conviction that this definition of admiralty
powers was narrower than the' Constitution contemplated, has been growing stronger every
day with the growing commerce on the lakes and navigable rivers of the western states."
(at 4si).
"Now there is certainly nothing in the ebb and flow of the tidei that makes the waters
peculiarly suitable for admiralty jurisdiction, nor anything in the absence of a tide that ren-
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as flowing from maritime jurisdiction 2 5 These broadened powers were yet
to emerge by the aid of interpretation from the legal lethargy which attends
training in the law.
On the other hand the commerce clause of the Constitution was viewed
as the keystone upon which federal power could be extended. 26 This failure
to appreciate the plastic qualities of maritime power,2 7 together with the
paucity of inland navigation when the Constitution was formed, 28 and the
manifest interest in potential federal control of commerce, 29 may have induced Webster to stake his argument on the commerce clause in Gibbons v.
Ogden 30 which, unwittingly enough, was later to have far-reaching effect
on federal control over hydro-electric generation.
In this case Chief Justice Marshall decreed that an exclusive monopoly
granted to Livingston and Fulton for a period of thirty years to operate
steam-propelled vessels on New York waters, was repugnant to the commerce clause and void. Webster saw in this clause the very origin of our
present Constitution; 31 and the court accepted his argument 32 that naviders it unfit. If it is a public navigable water, on which commerce is carried on between different states or nations, the reason for the jurisdiction is precisely the same." (at 454).
"Nor can the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States be made to depend on regulations of commerce. They are entirely distinct things, having no necessary connection with
one another, and are conferred in the Constitution by separate and distinct grants." Taney,
C. J., in The Propeller Genesee Chief et al. v. Fitzhugh et aL., 12 How. 443, 452 (U. S..
1851). See also, Jackson v. Steamboat Magnolia, 2o How. 296 (U. S. 1857); The Hine v.
Trevor, 4 Wall. 555 (U. S. 1866); Thd Belfast, 7 Wall. 624 (U. S. 1868); The Eagle, 8
Wall. 15 (U. S. 1868) ; Ex parte Boyer, io9 U. S. 629, 3 Sup. Ct. 434 (1884) ; The Robert
W. Parsons, 191 U. S. 17, 24 Sup. Ct. 8 (i9o3) ; I BENEDICT, ADMIRALTY (5th ed. 1925) 8-io;
ETTING, ADMIRALTY (1879) 49-54; GOULD, VATm s (3d ed. i9oo) §§ t6, 67; HuGHEs, ADMIRALTY (2d ed. i92o) § 4.
1 Art. 3, Sec. 2, cl. I of the Constitution reads: "The judicial Power shall extend . . .
to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction." It re Garnett, 141 U. S. 1, 12, II Sup.
Ct. 840, 842 (189o) : "It is unnecessary to invoke the power given to Congress to regulate
commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, in order to find authority to
pass the law in question. The Act of Congress which limits the liability of ship owners was
passed in amendment of the maritime law of the country, and the power to make such amendments is coextensive with that law." See THoMPsoN, FEDERAL CFNTRALIZATION (1923) 230,
231.
,2 WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE UNITED STATES HISTORY (2d ed. 1926) 54,
55. Art. I, Sec. 8, cl. 3 of the Constitution: "The Congress shall have Power . . . to
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
Tribes."
" "The derivation of the power to regulate navigation from the commerce cause rather
than from the admiralty clause was probably due to the feeling that a wider power would
thus be secured to Congress." GOODNOW, SOCIAL REFORM AND THE CONSTITUTION (1911) 48.
2 See The Hine v. Trevor, supranote 24, at 562.
2 VARREN, op. cit. supra note 26.
"ISupra note 6. See historical account of the trial in WARREN, op. cit. supra note 26,
c. i5. Cf. Veazie and Young v. Moor, 14 How. 568 (U. S. 1852). See The North River
Steam Boat Co. v. Livingston, 3 Cowen 713 (N. Y. I825).* As early as 1796 Congress seems
to have asserted its.power over navigation by the improvement of harbors. See CoNovER, op.
cit. supra note 7, at i6.
I Gibbons v. Ogden, supra note 6, at II.
2 WARREN, op. cit. supra note 25, at 70, 7r. Connecticut and New Jersey practiced retrosion. No one with such an exclusive license could enter Connecticut waters with a steam vessel If a New Jersey citizen was restrained under the New York law he was entitled to an ac-
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gation is commerce, and that it was illegal to exclude from New York
harbor a steam-propelled vessel operating under a federal coasting license.
Maritime as distinguished from commercial jurisdiction was not adverted
to; but federal power over interstate commerce as it pertains to "navigation
within the limits of every State in the Union" 3' was firmly entrenched.
But the expanded powers of the federal government under the ruling
of Gibbons v. Ogden were not to be interpreted as leaving states impotent
regarding their own navigable waters. In Willson v. Blackbird Creek Marsh
Co. 34 the company, in order to protect some marsh land from being over-

flown, had erected a dam across a small navigable creek, under license from
the State of Delaware. The defendants, who operated a sloop under a federal coasting license, broke the dam for which they were held liable in trespass in the state court. On review by the Supreme Court the judgment was
sustained on the ground that Congress had passed no act under the commerce clause which related to navigation of this or other small creeks similarly located. Consequently there was nothing repugnant about the state
act which empowered the Marsh Company to erect the dam.33
Suppose, then, a state should authorize an obstruction of a navigable
river such as the Hudson, by licensing the erection of a dam with lock, or
of a draw-bridge. The latter problem was presented in the state case of
People v. Rensselaer & SaratogaR. R. Co.3 The proceeding was in quo
warranto and tested the power of the state to grant the license. In Gibbons
v. Ogden the pretentions of the New York court for that state's exclusive
control over its navigable waters had been thwarted. The Saratoga case,
however, presented a different situation-although one not sanctioned by the
Blackbird Creek Marsh case. The court reasoned that the power to license
tion for damages with treble costs in N. J. See Webster's argument in Gibbons v. Ogden,
supra note 6, at 4, 5. Ohio offered the use of its ports on Lake Erie to New York licensees
only on the basis of reciprocity. See MAcGIuL & MEYER, THE HIsTORY OF TAunSPORTATION
IN THE U. S. BETO E i86o (917)
io6, io7.

' Gibbons v. Ogden, supra note 6, at x97. It should be noted that the vessel involved
was operating only on tide waters, i. e., between Elizabeth, New Jersey, and New York City.
" 2 Pet. 245 (U. S. 1829). See also Pound v. Turck, 95 U. S. 459 (1877) ; Manigault v.
Springs, 199 U. S. 473, 26 Sup. Ct. 127 09o5) ; Woodman v. Kilbourn Mfg. Co., I Bissel
546 (C. C. Wis. 1867). Early state cases: Brown v. Commonwealth, 3 S. & R. 273 (Pa.
I817) ; Hogg v. Zanesville Canal & Mfg. Co., 5 Ohio 410 (i832) ; Bacon v. Arthur, 4 Watts
437 (Pa. 1835); Depew v. Board of Trustees of Wabash & Erie Canal, 5 Ind. 8 (1854) ;
Stoughton v. Wisconsin, 5 Wis. 291 (1856) (federal license) ; Neaderhouser v. State, 28 Ind.
257 (1867).
' See also Cooley v. Board of Wardens of Port of Philadelphia, 12 How. 299 (U. S.
1851) (pilotage laws) ; Corfield v. Coryell, 4 Wash. 371 (C. C. Pa. 1823) and Smith v. Maryland, 18 How. 71 (U. S. 18.55) (oyster laws); County of Mobile v. Kimball, io2 U. S. 691
(188o) (liability of a county on a contract for harbor dredging when Congress had not
acted) ; Packet Co. v. Keokuk, 9.5 U. S. 8o (1877) ; Packet Co. v. Catlettsburg, io5 U. S.
559, 563 (881) ; Transportation Co. v. Parkersburg, io7 U. S. 691, 702, 2 Sup. Ct. 732, 741
(1882) ; Ouachita Packet Co. v. Aiken, 121 U. S. 444, 447, 7 Sup. Ct 907, 909 (1887)
(wharfage charges); City of N. Y. v. Miln, II Pet. iO2 (U. S. 1837) ; Turner v. Maryland,
107 U. S. 38, 2 Sup. Ct. 44 (1882) ; Morgan's S. S. Co. v. Louisiana, 118 U. S. 455, 6 Sup.
Ct 1114 (1885) (quarantine and inspection laws and harbor policing).
s15 Wend. 113 (N. Y. 1836).
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the erection of bridges over navigable streams must exist somewhere, and
since it had not-been delegated to the federal government, the conclusion was
inevitable that it remained with the state, subject to the qualification that the
state must not license impediments which would essentially injure navigability.37 This requirement was satisfied by the provision for a draw. State
autonomy, although humbled, had not been subdued.
In 1851, however, a case appeared which momentarily threatened to
upset the spirit of conciliation which seemingly was developing. This litigation 3s involved a bridge which had been erected over the channel of the
Ohio River at Wheeling under authority of an act of the General Assembly
of Virginia incorporating the bridge company."9 Pennsylvania feared that
the span was not high enough to permit the safe passage of boats, and
would interfere with the commerce of her canals and railroads. She accordingly sought to enjoin the maintenance of the bridge on the ground that it
was a nuisance. While the damage to Pennsylvania was small by comparison, river traffic had by that time grown into a great business so that the
court felt it "would be as unwise as it is unlawful to fetter, in any respect,
this vast commerce." 40 Although Congress had passed no special act interdicting obstructions on the Ohio River, it had ratified a compact entered into
between Virginia and Kentucky upon the latter's entry into the Union, which
provided that the use and navigation of the Ohio "shall be free and common
to the citizens of the United States." The court considered that under present conditions navigation was not free. 4 '

I Ibid. at 132: "I think I may safely say, that a power exists somewhere to erect bridges
over waters which are navigable, if the wants of society require them, provided such bridges
do not essentially injure the navigation of the waters which they cross. Such power certainly
did exist in the state legislatures, before the delegation of power to the federal government
by the federal constitution. It is not pretended that such power has been delegated to the
general government, or is conveyed under the power to regulate commerce and navigation;
it remains, then, in the state legislatures, or it exists nowhere. It does exist, because it has
not been surrendered any farther than such surrender may be qualifiedly implied-that is, the
power to erect bridges over navigable streams, must be considered so far surrendered as may
be necessary for a free navigation upon those streams. By a free navigation must not be
understood a navigation free from such partial obstacles, and impediments as the best interests
of society may render necessary." Quoted in Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge
Co., i3 Howard 518, 6o7 (U. S. 185I), disssenting opinion by Daniel, J.
Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 9 How. 647 (U. S. 185o), ii How.
528 (U.

S.

i85o), 13 How. 518 (U.

S.

I85I), I8

How. 421 (U.

S.

I855).

Although the bridge did not conform to the height required by the original act, a subsequent act of the Virginia legislature declared that the actual height at which it was erected
was lawful. Supra note 38, at 13 How. 558.
40 Ibid. 578.
" The complete text reads (ibid. s65) : "Congress have not declared in terms that a state,
by the construction of bridges, or otherwise, shall not obstruct the navigation of the Ohio,
but they have regulated navigation upon it, as before remarked, by licensing vessels, establishing ports of entry, imposing duties upon masters and other officers of boats, and inflicting
severe penalties for neglect of those duties, by which damage to life or ioroperty has resulted.
And they have expressly sanctioned the compact made by Virginia with Kentucky, at the time
of its admission into the Union 'that the use and navigation of the River Ohio, so far as the
territory of the proposed state, or the territory that shall remain within the limits of this
Commonwealth lies thereon, shall be free and common to the citizens of the United States'.
Now, an obstructed navigation cannot be said to be free . . .
"This compact, by the sanction of Congress, has become a law of the Union. What further legislation can be desired for judicial action?"
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In 1854 the bridge was blown down and an injunction was served on
the company against reconstructing it, but the order was ignored and the
bridge was erected. Thereupon a motion was filed for sequestration of
property, and another for an attachment of the officers of the company for
contempt. Between these last two hearings, however, the situation changed,
for the Bridgi Company procured from the federal government an act which
declared that the bridge was a part of the federal post-roads and lawful at
its present site and elevation. 4 2 This altered the complexion of the case,
and the court decided-not without discord-that although the bridge might
still be an obstruction in fact, it was no longer one in law. 43 The motions
were denied and the injunction was dissolved.
But even though the court reversed its position in these two hearings,
it had set a precedent for declaring as a nuisance any bridge which might
impede navigation. The law, however, was not settled at this point. In
The Passaic Bridges an injunction was sought by wharf owners for the
threatened obstruction of the Passaic River, which lay wholly within the
state of New Jersey, by the erection of two bridges under state permit. Newark, at and below the point at which the bridges were to be erected, had been
declared a port of entry, a fact which did not deter the court from deciding
that this case was governed by Willson v. The Black Bird Creek Marsh Co.,
and that if New Jersey cared to, she could close the river altogether.4 The
bill was dismissed.43
In EscanabaCo. v. Chicago 46 federal power was further curtailed. The
obstruction objected to was a Chicago ordinance which closed bridges in the
I Ibid. I8 How. at 429. See The Clinton Bridge, io Wall. 454 (U. S. 1870).
'31bid. 18 How. at 430: "So far, therefore, as this bridge created an obstruction to the
free navigation of the river, i view of the previous acts of Congress, they are to be regarded as modified by this subsequent legislation; and, although it still may be an obstruction
in fact is not so in the contemplation of law."
"3 Wall. 782, 793 (U. S. 1865) : "I'see no reason why the state of New Jersey, in the
exercise of her absolute sovereignty over the river, may not stop it up altogether." The
opinion in this case delivered by Justice Grier, was later affirmed by the Supreme Court by a
divided bench, and no report entered.
"In Gilman v. Philadelphia, 3 Wall. 713, 729 (U. S. 1865) Swayne, J., said: "It must
not be forgotten that bridges, which are connecting parts of turnpikes, streets and railroads,
are-means of commercial transportation as well as navigable waters, and that the commerce
which passes over a bridge may be much greater than would ever be transported on the water
it obstructs.
"It is Sor the municipal power to weigh the considerations which belong to the subject,
and to decide which shall be preferred, and how far either shall be made subservient to the
other. The states have always exercised this power, and from the nature and objects of the
two systems of government they must always continue to exercise it subject, however, in all
cases, to the paramount authority of Congress, whenever the power of the states shall be
exerted within the sphere of commercial power which belongs to the nation" See Flanagan v.
Philadelphia, 42 Pa. 219 (1862). Cf. Luxton v. North River Bridge Co., 153 U. S. 525, 530,
14 Sup. Ct. 891, 892 (1894).
"107 U. S. 678, 682, 688, 2 Sup. Ct. I85, 188, 193 (1882).
See also Wiggins Ferry Co. v.
East St. Louis, 107 U. S. 365, 2 Sup. Ct. 257 (1882) ; Transportation Co. v. Parkesburg, 1o7
U. S. 691, 2 Sup. Ct. 732 (1882) ; Huse v. Glover, 119 U. S 4, 543, 7, Sup. Ct. 313 (1886) ;
Sands v. Manistee River Improvement Co., 123 U. S. 288, 8 Sup. Ct. 113 (1887). Miller v.
Mayor etc. of the City of New York, iog U. S. 385, 3 Sup. Ct. 228 (1883) involved the erection of the Brooklyn Bridge under federal license.
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city at certain hours, and limited to ten minutes the time during which they
might remain open at any one period. The State of Illinois had delegated
to Chicago the power of controlling bridges within its limits. The court
reasserted that the paramount power of the federal government to regulate
interstate commerce involves the control of the waters of the United States
which are navigable in fact, so far as may be necessary to insure their free
navigation, when by themselves "or their connection with other waters they
form a continuous channel for commerce among the states or with foreign
countries." It conceded, however, that the states retained powers of internal
police, and that the power to control bridges resides properly with the state
or municipal authorities. Hence the local government must yield to the
federal only when there is a conflict. The generally recognized doctrine is
that the commercial power of Congress is exclusive of state authority only
as to matters which, being of a national character, require uniform regulation throughout the country.
In this case it was contended that the Northwest Ordinance by declaring that "the navigable waters leading into the Mississippi and St. Lawrence,
and the carrying places between the same, shall be common highways, and
forever free," 47 supplied the federal interdiction which prohibited local control-an argument by no means new. 48 The court pointed out that on its
admission into the Union, Illinois could exercise "the same power over
rivers within her limits that Delaware exercised over Black Bird Creek and
Pennsylvania over the Schuylkill River." Free navigation contemplated in
the Ordinance did not prevent the construction of bridges or ferries. A
direct interference by the federal government was necessary before state
authority over construction or management of her bridges would be terminated.
The court came to a similar conclusion regarding the erection of a
bridge in a state whose original charter provided that "all the navigable
waters of the said State shall be common highways, and forever free." 4
This clause was interpreted to refer to political rather than to physical obstructions, contrary to the interpretation of a similar clause in the Wheeling
case. Without some specific statute on the subject there was no federal law
"'Ordinancefor'the government of the territory of the United States Northwest of the
River Ohio, art. 4; MANVE 'S CODE, Laws of the Northwest Territory, p. xi; U. S. C. A.
Constitution (1928) pt. i, at 23.
11"Incorporations of bridges in such places have frequently been recognized by state
judiciaries as suitable exercises of power by States . . .
"In the States within what was governed by the ordinance of the Northwestern Territory, perhaps, this could not be done, as that ordinance declared that all navigable rivers
But I speak of states without any such restricwithin it shall be 'common highways' ....
tion." . . . United States v. The New Bedford Bridge, i Woodbury and Minot's Reports
401, 411 CU. S. C. C. 1846).
"Willamette Iron Bridge Co. v. Hatch, 125 U. S. 1, 5, 8 Sup. Ct. 81I, 813 (1887). See
also Cardwell v. American Bridge Co., I13 U. S. 205, 5 Sup. Ct. 423 (1885) ; Hamilton v.
Vicksburg etc. R. R. Co., I19 U. S. 280, 7 Sup. Ct. 2o6 (1886).
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for the restraining of such erections, since there was "no common law of the
United States which prohibits obstructions and nuisances in navigable rivers,
unless it be the maritime law, administered by the courts of admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction." 50 The first Wheeling Bridge case was explained
on the grounds that the court had original jurisdiction because a state was
a party, and so could invoke any applicable law whether state, federal or international. Consequently in that case the original obstruction was illegal
both because it violated the terms of the compact and because "the bridge,
so constructed, injuriously affected a super-riparian state [Pennsylvania]
bordering on the river, contrary to international law." 51
It is interesting that the lead taken in the first of the Wheeling Bridge
cases was repudiated during a period generally known for the expansion
of federal power by the Supreme Court. 52 Perhaps the political pressure
which entered that "unequal contest" 53 inveighed too heavily against the
precipitant interjection by the court into matters of state and federal highway improvements. Railroads were coming into prominence. Compromises were necessary between the growing needs of land and water travel
in the West. Federal control of bridges was no longer merely a corollary
to its jurisdiction over navigation but was now a part of its expanding power
over interstate commerce. Legislative censure and a change of personnel
on the bench paved the way for a difference in the meaning of "free" navigation as the provision appeared in a compact between states, and in an ordinance or state charter. From a physical connotation the interpretation had
shifted to a political one. The sophistry though obvious was harmless since
it permitted the toleration of reasonable impediments. The -"licensing of
vessels, establishing ports of entry, imposing of duties upon masters and
other officers of boats" 54 were of no greater moment in the West than in
the East.53 The court had become chary. Federal policy was taking form.
There was no uncertainty, however, about the power of Congress to
revoke or amend the terms of a federal license. In Bridge Co. v. United
States 50 the government by resolution gave its assent to the erection of a
bridge across the Ohio River at Cincinnati, which was to be constructed
according to the terms of charters from Ohio and Kentucky. The privilege
of withdrawing consent was reserved in case the bridge should at any time
' WillAnette Iron Bridge Co. v. Hatch, supra note 49, at 8, 8 Sup. Ct. at 815.
" Ibid. x5, 16. See also The Passaic Bridges, supra note 44, at 792. But cf. reasoning in
The Wheeling Bridge Case, supra note 41.
See i WARREN, op. cit. supra, note 26, at 507-510; 3 ibid. at 353. See also A. H. Wintersteen, The Commerce Clause and the State (1889) 37 A_. L. REG. 733, 736.
Greer, J., in The Passaic Bridges, supra note 44, at 791.
' S-upra note 41.
E. g., The Passaic Bridges, supra note 44.
io5 U. S. 470 (1881). See International Bridge Co. v. New York, 254 U. S. 126, 41

Sup. Ct. 56

(192o).
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become a substantial and material obstruction to the river. While construction was in progress Congress demanded certain alterations. These were
complied with, and an action was brought for the additional expense. In
denying liability the court relied partly on the revocation clause in the resolution, and declared that Congress had the power to say when a bridge became
a nuisance. Since the company took the risk of revocation when it accepted
congressional permission, there was no duty to pay. In later cases such
withdrawal of assent under the River and Harbor Acts of 189o and 1899 "
were declared lawful without entailing a duty to recompense, whether or not
the power of revocation or amendment was expressly reserved. 5
As will appear later, this judicial policy which forbids a court to consider legislative motives or necessity for action, and which extends immunity
to congressional caprice, has been a potent factor in the extension of federal
power over water highways, and in the expansion of control over the hydroelectric industry.
By 189o the line between federal and state jurisdiction over .inland
navigable waters was quite sharply drawn. Federal power championed by
the commerce clause had been developed in a group of cases which chiefly
involved the erection and licensing of bridges, the doctrine of which could
be and was equally applied to dam construction. The dominance of federal control was established, but the exercise of state police power was not
suppressed where the federal government remained inactive. Special legislation was required to vitalize federal supremacy. This defect was remedied
when general federal supervision was introduced in the River and Harbor
Act of 189 o.59 With its passage the evolution of federal power and policy
over river obstruction, begun with Gibbons v. Ogden, was crystallized. The
states might still act, but under central tutelage. The commerce clause vindicated federal paternalism, and assured a unitary regulation of constructions
when interstate commerce on navigable waters was involved. The reprisals

" Infra note 59.
' Union Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 U. S. 364, 27 Sup. Ct. 367 (i9o6) ; Hannibal
Bridge Co. v. United States, 221 U. S. 194, 31 Sup. Ct. 603 (191o) ; Louisville Bridge Co. v.
U. S., 242 U. S. 409, 37 Sup. Ct. X58 (1916).
M26 STAT. 454 (1890), 33 U. S. C. A. § 401 (1926) : "It shall not be lawful to construct
or commence the construction of any bridge, dam, dike, or causeway over any port, roadstead,
haven, harbor, canal, navigable river, or other navigable water of the United States until the
consent of Congress to the building of such structures shall have been obtained and until the
plans for the same shall have been submitted to and approved by the Chief of Engineers and
by the Secretary of War:. Provided, That such structures may be built under authority of
the legislature of a state across rivers and other waterways the navigable portions of which
lie wholly within the limits of a single state, provided the location and plans thereof are submitted to and approved by the Chief of Engineers and by the Secretary of War before construction is commenced" . . . See Dunn, Federal Control of Navigable Rivers (1914) 1
IowA L. Buu.L 1O7, 127.
It was held in Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. v. Ohio, 165 U. S.365, 369, i7Sup. Ct. 357, 359
(1897) that the Act of 189o did not deprive the states of authority to bridge a navigable
stream, but simply created "an additional and cumulative remedy to prevent such structures,
although lawfully authorized, from interfering with commerce".
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"0were no longer possible. National interest in water highways was
actively represented and protected by congressional surveillance. The period
of isolated state control subject to sporadic incursions of federal power
was at an end, but the time for federal intervention in the interstate transmission of electric power was still in the future.
of

1824

II
It was inevitable that the exercise of this expanding federal power
should come into conflict with the interests of riparian property owners. In
England the tide-water test for navigability carried with it ownership by the
Crown of lands submerged under tide waters. Following the Revolution,
the American sovereign states succeeded to the Crown's title."' This was
not surrendered to the newly-formed central government.6 2 Title to land
submerged under non-tidal waters was, in England, prima facie in riparian
owners. 63 In this country the final rejection of the tidal test for navigability
was followed in some states by an extension of state ownership to lands
under non-tidal navigable waters.4 This is the federal rule which the government applies in its territories.6 5 Newly created states succeeded to the
rights of the United States; 66 but whether they adopted the American or
the English rule of ownership of land under non-tidal but navigable waters,

6
was classed as a matter of state law.

In either event the riparian owner has suffered in his contests with
federal power over navigation. In TransportationCo. v. Chicago 68 the city,
as agent of the state in building a tunnel under the Chicago River, was dedared immune from liability for damages to a riparian owner for temporarily cutting off access by water to his docks. Since there was no direct
I Supra note 32.
Martin v. Lessee of Waddell, 16 Pet. 367 (U. S. 1842) ; Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U. S.

328 (1876); Illinois Cent. R. R. v. Illinois, 146 U. S. 387, 13 Sup. Ct. 110 (1892);
Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U. S. 1, 48-50, 58, 14 Sup. Ct. 548, 566, 570 (1893) ; United States v.
Holt Bank, 270 U. S. 49, 46 Sup. Ct. 197 (925).
' Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 3 How. 212, 230 (U. S. 1845); County of St. Clair v.
324,

Lovingston, 23 Wall. 46, 68 (U. S. x874).
' Murphy v. Ryan, z Ir. R. C. L. 143 (1868) ; Pearce v. Scholcher, 9 Q. B. D. i62
(1882) ; Orr Ewing v. Colquhoun, 2 App. Cas. 839 (877) ; Reece v. Miller, 8 Q. B. D. 626
(x882); TxFFANY, RAL PROPERTY (1912) 1012.

Barney v. Keokuk; Illinois Cent. R. R. v. Illinois, both supra note 6I.
"Shively v. Bowlby, supro note 61; McGilvra v. Ross, 215 U. S. 70, 30 Sup. Ct. 27
(9o9).

Goodtitle v. Kibbe, 9 How. 471 (U. S. i85o) ; County of St. Clair v. Lovingston, supra

note 62; Scott v. Lattig, 227 U. S. 229, 243, 33 Sup. Ct. 242, 244 (1912) ; United States v.

Utah, 283 U. S. 64, 51 Sup. Ct. 438 (x931).
I Barney v. Keokuk, sura note 6,; Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U. S. 371, 382, II Sup. Ct.
8o8, 812 (i89i); Shively v. Bowlby, supra note 61; Scott v. Lattig, supra note 66; Port of
Seattle v. Oregon & W. R- R., 255 U. S. 56, 63, 41 Sup. Ct. 237. 239 (1920).

Is99 U. S. 635 (1878).
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encroachment on private property, there was no "taking" within the meaning
of the constitutional prohibition.
The doctrine of this case was affirmed in Gibson v. United States. 9
In the course of improving the Ohio River near Pittsburgh the government
erected a dyke, which for the greater part of the marketing season substantially deprived Mrs. Gibson of the use of a boat-landing at her marketgarden. As a result the value of her property was greatly reduced. A judgment for the defendant in the court of claims was affirmed on the ground
that the interest of a riparian owner, whether title to the submerged land
be in her or in the state, is subject to a servitude with respect to navigation
70
in favor of the federal government.
The third case 71 in this series involved a pier which was erected as a
part of the Sault Ste. Marie canal across the front of certain shore property,
thereby cutting off access by boats of greater than five feet draft. No part
of the pier touched the plaintiff's shore land. By Michigan law the riparian
owner held title to the submerged land on which the pier was constructed.
A government official refused the shore owner the privilege of landing
freight on the pier, whereupon the owner filed a suit in ejectment. Judgment
for the defendant in the state court was affirmed, and the government's
immunity was again placed on the authority of the commerce clause.
In the Green Bay cases the power of a state or the federal government
to appropriate the water-power generated at a navigation project, came
directly under review. Tpon Wisconsin's admission into the Union, the
federal government conveyed certain lands to it as financial aid in improving
navigation on the Fox and Wisconsin Rivers. A dam with canal and locks
was to be constructed. The state legislature provided that the water-power
created by the contemplated improvement should belong to the state. Finding itself unable to complete the work, the state incorporated and conveyed
all of its property to an improvement company, to which the Green Bay
and Mississippi Canal Company was the successor. Afterwards the federal
government took over the enterprise. In the transfer of property which was
involved, some land and the water-rights which were received from the state
were reserved by the company. Later, when the Kaukauna Water Power
Company commenced to construct a sluiceway on its land in order to tap the
water back of the dam for hydraulic purposes, the Canal Company obtained
an injunction in the state court. The constitutionality of the state statute
under which the Canal Company derived its exclusive ownership of the
I166 U. S. 269, 17 Sup. Ct. 578 (I896).
""Moreover, riparian ownership is subject to the obligation to suffer the consequences
of the improvement of navigation in the exercise of the dominant right of Government in
that regard" Ibid. at 276, 17 Sup. Ct. at 58o.
7 Scranton v. Wheeler, 179 U. S. 141, 21 Sup. Ct. 48 (igoo).
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water-power, thus brought in issue, was decided in the Supreme Court in
favor of the petitioner.
The court admitted that it would be beyond the competency of a state
to usurp the water-power of a stream for the sole purpose of leasing it for
manufacturing without compensating riparian owners. It saw no sound reason, however, why any surplus water produced by the erection of a dam
as a part of a navigation improvement, might not be appropriated without
payment. Protection of navigation might necessitate the retention of control over the surplus water. Its rental might be efficacious in financing the
undertaking. To reserve the water-power at dams erected under state permit as parts of public improvements, seemed to be the practice in New York,
Ohio, Wisconsin and possibly in other states.
A line was drawn between cases where 72 "the dam is erected for the
express or apparent purpose of obtaining a water power to lease to private
individuals, or where in building a dam for a public improvement, a wholly
unnecessary excess is created, and cases where the surplus is a mere incident
to the public improvement and a reasonable provision for securing an adequate supply of water at all times for such improvement. . . . So long
as the dam was erected for a bona fide purpose of furnishing an adequate
supply of water for the canal and was not a colorable device for creating
a water power, the agents of the state are entitled to great latitude of discretion in regard to the height of the dam and the head of water to be created;
and while the surplus in this case may be unnecessarily large, there does not
seem to have ben any bad faith or abuse of discretion on the part of those
charged with the construction of the improvement."
In subsequent litigation the rights of the Canal Company to surplus
water not needed for navigation were directly contested. It was shown that
only one per cent. of the flow was needed for the canal. This, the lower
riparian owners claimed, was the extent to which water could be diverted
from its natural course. The state superior court ruled that the Canal Com-:
pany was entitled to all of the surplus, and was not required to allow any
of it to flow over the dam. The ruling was reversed in the state supreme
court 7 3 which held that the limit of the right to divert without compensation
was the need for navigation purposes. Beyond this amount the ordinary
rule governed which protects lower riparian owners in the natural flow of
water past their lands. The court admitted that it might not be feasible
to measure the exact quantity of water necessary for navigation purposes,
and that the surplus need not run to waste. But the salable power was that
"

Kaukauna Water Power Co. v. Green Bay & Miss. Canal Co.,

Sup. Ct. 173, 178 (89).

142 U. S. 254, 275, 12
See also Port of Seattle v. Oregon & W. R. R., supra note 67;

United States v. River Rouge, 269 U. S. 411, 419, 46 Sup. Ct. 144, 147 (1925) ; Wisconsin v.

Illinois, 278 U. S. 367, 418, 49 Sup. Ct. 163, 172 (1928).
"Green Bay & Miss. Canal Co. y. Kaukauna Water Power Co., 0o Wis. 370, 6i N. W.

1121 (1895).
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which the dam produced by reason' of the fall of water from its crest to foot.
The company, however, was selling the power which was caused by cutting
the canal. This was not incidental to the erection of the dam, but was generated for its own sake, and hence was illegal.
The state court held that the company's rights to water-power were
measured by the original reservation by the state. The Canal Company contended that they were derived from the contract with the federal government for the sale of the dam, locks and canal. On appeal the Supreme Court
decreed that the company was entitled to whatever rights the federal government might have to the incidental water-power.74 The reservation of
this power in the deed to the government was as effective as if the company
had first deeded its rights to the government and the latter had deeded them
back in part payment. As the United States had entered the field, state
authority had ceased; and since the federal government enjoyed the sole
control of the property, it might determine where water could be withdrawn,
and what was surplus. The court considered that both by state and federal
acts all of the power produced by the dam and canal was to be used in defraying the expense of construction. To this the. Canal Company was
entitled. As a matter of fact the act by which the federal government took
over the property provided for any damages which might be caused by loss
of flowage.
In United States v. Chandler-DunbarWater Co.7 5 the control of the
federal government over water-powers on navigable streams was more firmly
cemented. By state law the company was the owner of the land under
St. Mary's River, Michigan, opposite its shore property. Under federal
permit it had erected dams, dykes and forebays, and was engaged in the
business of using and selling water-power. In a condemnation suit brought
by the federal government to acquire land for use in improving the Sault
Canal, an award of $550,000 was made for the estimated value.of this waterpower of which the company was to be deprived. The Supreme Court reversed the award. It admitted the company's ownership of the river bottom,
but said that it was subordinate "to the public right of navigation, and however helpful in protecting the owner against the acts of third parties, is of
no avail against the exercise of the great and absolute power of Congress
over the improvement of navigable rivers."
'GreenBay & Miss. Canal Co. v. Patten Paper Co., 172 U. S.58, 19 Sup. Ct 97 (898).
See Water Power Co. v. Water Comm., 168 U. S.349, 18 Sup. Ct. 157 (1897).
Z229 U. S.53, 62, 73, 33 Sup. Ct. 667, 671, 676 (1912).
See also Wisconsin v. Duluth,
96 U. S.379, 387 (1877) ; Hill v. United States, 149 U. S. 593, 13 Sup. Ct. 1o11 (1892) ;
Lewis Blue Point Oyster Cultivation Co. v. Briggs, 229 U. S.82, 33 Sup. Ct. 679 (1912) ;
Greenleaf Lumber Co. v. Garrison, 237 U. S.251, 35 Sup. Ct. 55, (914) ; Willink v. United
States, 240 U. S..572, 36 Sup. Ct. 422 (i915) ; Hawkins Point Light-House Case, 39 Fed.
77, 83 (C. C. Md. 1889). Cf. South Carolina v. Georgia, 93 U. S.4 (1876) with Cohan v.
United States, 162 Fed. 364 (C. C. N. D. Cal. 1908).
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Although the company was entitled to compensation for the shore land
thus condemned, it was not the owner of the water-power. Use of this
depended on suffrance, and the government had revoked the company's
license. The court felt that it was unnecessary to consider whether in depriving the company of its privilege of using the river's power the government must pay in case it be found that all of the water was not needed for
purposes of navigation. Since Congress had decided that this part of the
river was necessary for navigation, the question was settled and the erection
in the river of structures for hydraulic purposes was concluded. If the government should sell any excess power "which might result from the construction of such controlling or remedial works as shall be found advisable for
the improvement of navigation", the company would have no legal ground
for complaint since none of its property would be "taken" thereby. Any
remuneration which might accrue to the government in this way, could not
possibly concern the company. Thus far have logic and precedent carried us.
But the governmental immunity which was extended to a private corporation in the Green Bay cases,76 is not always assured by the granting of
a federal license. In. Ford & Son v. Little Falls Fibre Co.,77 the Ford
Company had obtained a permit from the Commission to utilize water-power
from the Federal Dam on the Hudson River. The permit sanctioned the
erection of flash boards "in the interests of navigation." This added construction raised the water of the Hudson and its navigable tributary, the Mohawk, where it impeded the production of power at a dam owned by the
Little Falls Company. For this interference the latter obtained an injunction and damages in the New York court on the ground that the injury
constituted a wrong by local law.The Ford Company defended in the Supreme Court on the basis of
an immunity represented by the license, and by the finding of the Power
Commission that what was done was desirable and justified as a means
of improving the Hudson River in aid of interstate commerce; and that
even if the finding of the Commission was not conclusive, still in fact navigation was benefited by the use of flash boards. But these contentions were
not sustained, and the state ruling was upheld on the ground that payment
by federal licensees for damage done to the property of others was specifically contemplated by the terms of the Power Act.
In one class of cases the Supreme Court has declared that the erection
of a dam for purposes of navigation may constitute a "taking" of property
other than the shore on which the structure rests, so as to require compen' Supra notes 72 and 74.
"280 U. S. 369, 5o Sup. Ct. 140 (1930) ; 249 N. Y. 495, 164 N. E. 558 (1928).
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sation. This is where lands are actually overflowed by back-water.7 8 However, no liability attaches when the damage is merely consequential, as where
flooding is the result of placing revetments in a river to prevent erosion, 79
or where government levees have raised the level of water during floods
thereby submerging nearby lands. s° That a person is compelled to expend
money to protect his land from being overflowed does not necessarily create a case within the constitutional mandate."'
The effect of the doctrine which these cases evolve is to grant to the
riparian owner a right to the use of water-power dependent for its duration
upon governmental suffrance and the requirements of navigation. In its control over interstate navigation the federal government is paramount. The
privileges of original ownership are thus partially recouped by the states
and the central government. However, since the limitations of the commerce clause early confined federal supervision to navigable waters, the
recovery is not complete. In the Green Bay cases the inherent qualifications
of the source of authority were manifested in a further requirement. The
creation of power must not be the primary purpose for which a dam is constructed. It may be a subsidiary one, an incident to an improvement of
navigation measured in terms of the need. s2 Since it is clear that an improving company will erect a dam and lock mainly for the purpose of
obtaining power, the interests of the government and of the licensed company will usually be nominally different. While this inconsistency will not
in itself be fatal to the legality of a project so long as the government's
ostensible purpose is lawful, the problem involved is apparent.
In the course of developing federal jurisdiction in these cases, whether
under the commerce or the admiralty clause, the significance of "navigability" rather than of "tide-water" as a test has required definition and explanation. It was not the intention of the federal government, as expressed
through its courts, to include within the orbit of the term all that it connotes,
but rather to give it a utilitarian meaning 8 3 A river must be navigable in
" Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 13 Wall. 166, 181 (U. S. 1871) ; United States v. Lynah,
188 U. S. 445. 23 Sup. Ct. 349 (19o3) ; United States v. Welch, 217 U. S. 333, 3o Sup. Ct.
527 (igio) ; United States v. Grizzard, 219 U. S. 18o. 31 Sup. Ct. 162 (1911). See United
States v. Great Falls Mfg. Co., 112 U. S.645, 5 Sup. Ct. 306 (1884).
'Bedford v. United States, 192 U. S. 217, 24 Sup. Ct. 238 (1904).
'Jackson v. United States, 230 U. S. 1, 21, 33 Sup. Ct. ioli, 118 (1913). See Cubbins

v. Mississippi River Comm., 241 U. S.351, 36 Sup. Ct. 671 (1916) ; County Ct. of Md. Co.,
W. Va., v. United States, 53 Ct. Cl. 120 (1918). But cf. Kincaid v. United States, 37 Fed.
(2d) 6o2 (W. D. La. 1922).
I Manigault v. Springs, supra note 34. In Louisiana by constitution and statute property
may be taken for the construction of public levees without compensation, Eldridge v. Trezevant, 16o U. S.452, 16 Sup. Ct. 345 (1896).
'See Dunn, op. cit. supra note 59, at 118, but cf. discussion of Osage and Boulder Dam
cases, intfra notes 1O4 and 117.
I "It is not every ditch, in which the salt water ebbs and flows, through the extensive
salt marshes along the coast, and which serve to admit and drain off the salt water from the
marshes, which can be considered a navigable stream. Nor is it every small creek, in which
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fact as a highway of commerce between different states or countries, since
rivers although navigable, if wholly within the borders of a state and not a
portion of an interstate route, are classed as waters of that state.8 4 Further, such waterways must be susceptible of navigation in their ordinary
condition, and by customary "modes of trade and travel". However, the
presence of shallows, rapids, falls or carrying places is not conclusive against
jurisdiction, so long as in its natural state a river affords a channel for useful
commerce. 5 In establishing the fact of navigability the court does not consider itself bound by previous state holdings, but makes its own investigations."6 Nor is it decisive that a river is not then used for navigation, if it
once was.8 7 But in settling the question of former use, vague reports or
ancient hearsay are not controlling in the face of present evidence. 88
III
The extent to which the government may authorize the construction
of power dams as an incident to flood control has never been defined. In
the Mississippi River valley federal participation in this work was originally
a fishing skiff or a gunning canoe can be made to float at high water, which is deemed navigable. But in order to have this character, it must be navigable to some purpose, useful to
trade or agriculture": Justice Shaw in Rowe v. The Granite Bridge Corp., 21 Pick. 344,
347 (Mass. 1838); quoted in The Montello, 20 Wall. 430, 443 (U. S. 1874), and Leovy v.
United States, 177 U. S. 621, 634, 20 Sup. Ct. 797, 802 (igoo). See Harrison vi Fite, 148
Fed. 781, 783 (C. C. A. 8th, 19o6).
" "Those rivers must be regarded as public navigable rivers in law which are navigable
in fact, and they are navigable in fact when they are used, or are susceptible of being used, in
their ordinary condition, as highways for commerce, over which trade and travel are or may
be conducted in the customary modes of trade and travel on water. And they constitute
navigable waters of the United States within the meaning of the acts of Congress, in contradistinction from the navigable waters of the states, when they form in their ordinary conditions by themselves, or by uniting with other waters, a continued highway over which commerce is or may be carried on with other states or foreign countries in the customary modes
in which such commerce is conducted by water": Justice Field in The Daniel Ball, io Wall.
557, 563 (U. S. 1870). See The Montello, supra note 83, and ix Wall 4 411 (U. S. 187o) ;
Economy L. & P. Co. v. United States, 256 U. S. 113, 41 Sup. Ct. 409 (192I) ; Oklahoma v.
Texas, 258 U. S. 574, 42 Sup. Ct. 4o6 (1922); Brewer-Elliott Oil & Gas Co. v. United States,
260 U. S. 77, 86, 43 Sup. Ct. 6o, 63 (1922); United States v. Burlington etc. Ferry Co., 21
Fed. 331 (S. D. Iowa 1884) ; Toledo Liberal Shooting Co. v. Erie Shooting Club, 90 Fed. 68o
(C. C. A. 6th, 1898) ; Harrison v. Fite, 148 Fed. 781, 784 (C. C. A. 8th, 19o6).
' The Montello, supra note 83. See also United States v. Holt State Bank, supra note
61; United States v. Utah, 5' Sup. Ct. 438, 443 (1931).
"So far has this doctrine been carried, that in the very recent case [The Montello, supra
note 83] a river in Wisconsin was declared to have been navigable when commerce was carried on by means of boats drawing two and a half feet of water, propelled by animal power,
and obliged by reason of obstructions to be carried at intervals over portages. It was shown
at this period, even with these obstacles, the river formed the channel by which a large and
useful commerce was maintained, and that was held to be the decisive point." ETnxG, ADMMALTY

(1879) 63-

Since the legal navigability of a stream depends in each instance upon its facts, the
potentiality of extending" federal jurisdiction in the absence of stare decisis and in view of
the looseness of definition, is clearly in the hands of the Supreme Court.
Economy L. & P. Co. v. United States; Oklahoma 'v. Texas, both supra note 84.
Economy L. & P. Co. v. United States, supra note 84.
Oklahoma v. Texas, supranote 84, at 586, 587, 42 Sup. Ct. at 411. See Missouri v. Kentucky, ii Wall. 395, 410 (U. S. 1870). Cf. The Montello, supra note 84, at 440.

CONTROL OF SUPER-POWER

classed as improvement of navigation. s9 It can hardly be said, however,
that the government has confined its activities within the limits of the commerce clause. 0 Advocates of federal aid have called attention to the railroads that have been inundated, bridges and federal property that have been
destroyed, and the health that has been endangered by devastating floods.
They have also argued that if the tendering of assistance to flood victims
is a legitimate function under the "general welfare" clause, the prevention
of hardships and suffering which attend such catastrophies is at least equally
legitimate.9 1 Such an interpretation if extended logically would legalize the
erection of federal dams for flood prevention on other than navigable rivers.
In the St. Lawrence region federal authority under the commerce
clause is strengthened by the treaty-making power. 92 Its use in this connection is not without precedent in the early treaties with the Indians which
guaranteed to them fishing and water rights.93 But rather than restricting
federal participation to international agreements, or to the subject of the
first phase of this article, this expressly delegated function presages governmental intervention in any pact by which the distribution of electric power,
whether hydraulic or fuel, is to be regulated by interstate agreement.94
In the Niagara section federal power over hydro-electric generation is
not apt to be associated with construction of dams. So far as actual participation of the government in navigation projects at this point is concerned,
the cases of Scranton v. Wheeler and United States v. Chandler-Dunbar
Water Co.95 serve as precedentp, but many questions as yet undecided may
arise.
In 1925 an interesting exchange of letters " passed between Mr.
Charles E. Hughes, then special attorney for the State of New York, and
Cubbins v. Mississippi River Comm., supra note 80.
"But when the government departs from the policy of building levees and other pultlic
works for the purpose of commerce and navigation alone, and expressly entered the field of
controlling floods for the protection and reclamation of private lands, then it became engaged
in activities which make it responsible for the invasion of private rights": Kincaid v. United
States, supra note 8o, at 607. Section 232 of the Mississippi Constitution provides that the
commissioners of certain levee districts "shall have power to'cede all their rights of way and
levees and the maintenance, management and control thereof to the government of the United
States."
'

FRANK,

THE DEVELoPMENT

Mississrpri RivEn (i93o) c. V.

OF THE

FEDERAL PROGRAM

OF FLOOD CONTROL ON THE

' See 34 STAT. 626 (i9o6) and 36 STAT. 2448 (igog). For treaties with Mexico regarding the Colorado and the Rio Grande Rivers see: Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, I TREATIES,
CONVENTioNs, etc. (Malloy, i9io) 1io7 (SEN. Doc. No. 357, 61st Cong. 2d Sess..) ; Gadsden

Treaty, art. iv, ibid. 12I, 1123; Boundary Convention of i889, arts. i, v, ibid. 1167-92; Convention of i9o6, Treaty Series, No. 445, 21 Op. ATY. GEN. 274, 282.
" United States v. Winans, 198 U. S. 371, 25 Sup. Ct. 662 (1904) ;-Winters v. United
States,

U. S. 564, 28 Sup. Ct. 207 (i907) ; KERWIN, oP. cit. suPra note I, at 69-72.
Art. x, Sec. 10, cl. 3; OLSON, THE COLORADO RIvER COMPACT
S. CosvmrruTo,

207

"U.

(1926) 65-70.

" Supra notes 71 and 75.

"See

FEDERAL

PowER Comm. ANN. REP. 1926, at 155-165.
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Mr. 0. C. Merrill, executive secretary for the Federal Power Commission.
The New York Power Commission had licensed the Lower Niagara River
Power and Water Supply Company to take water from the Maid of the
Mist pool below Niagara Falls for the purpose of generating electric power,
which was to be used solely in New York State. No dam was proposed.
The intake would not interfere with navigation, and the water to be extracted would not exceed an amount allotted in 19o9 to American users in
a treaty with Great Britain. A federal license was necessary, and the correspondence concerned the conflicts in federal and state authority which
seemed to be raised by the terms of the license.
The first of these letters concerned the provisions for supervision of
plant construction which Mr. Hughes, as spokesman for the attorney general of New York, felt should be confined on the part of the federal government to such features as might affect navigation. Beyond this he thought
that these matters were purely of state concern. The provision for annual
charges was disputed on the ground that in this case no land or property
of the United States was involved. It was "the position of the attorney
general of New York" that in this instance the state should derive any
benefit which might come from taxation.
Objection was made to the amortization and recapture clauses. The
New York license contained a similar provision for recapture, and the state's
contention was that "neither the Congress nor your commission has constitutional authority to provide in the manuer contemplated for the recapture, taking over, maintenance and operation of the project works under
consideration, situated wholly within the state of New York and devoted
to the development, use, furnishing and sale of power within that state,
simply because they constitute a water-power development and without regard to proper federal purposes and compliance with constitutional requirements." Such recapture would not be incidental to the protection of navigation and would be an invasion of New York's constitutional authority.
A similar objection was made to another article which subjected rates
and service of the petitioning company to the supervision of the commission.
In his answer Mr. Merrill called attention to the purpose of the company to draw 19,500 cubic feet of water per second from a navigable portion
of the Niagara River, and to the terms of an international treaty and statutes
which required federal authorization for such a project. The possible effect
on navigation and the international character of the stream were sufficient
to justify calling for approval of plans and the insertion of a time limitation within which the project must be completed. The requirements were
in accordance with either specific statutes or consistent congressional policy.
In matters of construction the state and federal governments enjoyed concurrent powers, but it should be assumed that each had the public interest
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in view, and that co6peration would not be difficult. As to annual charges,
neither the purpose nor the terms of the Federal Power Act contemplated
the derivation of revenue from such projects. The issuing of a license would
in no way interfere with the collection of state revenue. 97
Regarding the recapture clause: 9s "It is the opinion of the Commission
that the provisions of section 14 of the Federal water power act respecting
acquisition by the United States of properties under license are not, and
were not intended to be, of themselves, a grant of authority to acquire such
properties for the United States. It seems elementary that the United
States may acquire private property for a public use, and that what constitutes a public use must be interpreted in the light of the constitutional powers
of Congress as possessed at the time the property is to be taken. Unless
during the next fifty years Congress shall be given, through amendment
of the Constitution, authority to acquire property for purposes not now
authorized its rights of recapture when a license expires will be limited
to the same purposes for which such right might now be constitutionally
exercised namely, for government purposes." Further, the act seemed to
contemplate the possibility of recapture by a state, so that the inclusion
of this clause in the federal permit did not militate against a similar one
in the state permit.
Co6peration of the federal with state authority was stressed in the matters of recognition of assignees and rates. In the former instance the commission's approval was dependent upon prior state sanction. In the latter
its control of interstate rates was not disputed, and control of intrastate
rates depended upon the absence of state supervision."9 New York's assumption of regulation eliminated the possibility of present conflict. In any
event exercise of federal intervention was purely discretionary and confined
to constitutional authority.
The attitude of -the Power Commission as set forth in- Mr. Merrill's
letter may be consoling to states and to industry, but does it announce an
enduring policy? To any assurance that the government will not enter the
business of generating and distributing power on a commercial basis,
Muscle Shoals looms as a query. The recent veto of the Norris bill "0
sheds no light on the constitutional phases of the subject. Should Congress
' Prior to the enactment of the Power Act the requirement of tolls from a licensee was
strenuously fought by advocates of states' rights. In 1913 the inclusion of such a provision
in a license to The Connecticut River Company, which was not adverse to it, led to the rejection of the bill in Congress. The omission of such charges figured prominently in the vetoes
of the James River and the Rainey River bills by President Roosevelt, and of the Coosa River
bill by President Taft. See Kza-win, op. cit. supra note I, at 8o-85, 114-142.
's See Fox River Paper Co. v. Railroad Comm. of Wisconsin, 274 U. S. 651, 47 Sup. Ct.
669 (1927) for a state license which contained a recapture clause with no provision for compensation.
" This phase of the Power Act is discussed at p. 182.
uo U. S. Daily, March 4, 1931, at i.
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as a matter of political economy consider it feasible to experiment with the
recapture clause in one of .the numerous federal permits, the success of the
venture from a legal standpoint may depend more upon the choice of the
project and the conditions under which it is taken over than upon the need
for a constitutional amendment within fifty years. It is precarious to generalize. The commerce clause is probably still capable of stretching to
include a favorable case. Legitimate ends and appropriate means may have
their bearing, and the property clause in the Constitution 10 ' should not be
overlooked.
The constitutionality of the Federal Water Power Act has been attacked
in a few cases, but as yet the Supreme Court has avoided expressing itself
in a direct issue. In 1922 the State of New York filed an action to test the
validity of the statute, but later withdrew it.102- In the same year a federal
district court sitting in Alabama 103 declared the act to be constitutional. In
that instance a licensee proceeded under section 21 to condemn land on the
Coosa River. The statute was assailed as an invasion of state power to
regulate hydro-electric generation, transmission and distribution, and as an
attempt to put the government into business. The court referred to Chief
Justice Marshall's rule for constitutional interpretation and found that the
enactment was for the improvement of navigation-a legitimate end under
the commerce clause ever since the case of Gibbons v. Ogden. While it would
be palpably beyond constitutional limits for the government to embark in
the business of generating and selling electricity, yet the cases of United
States v. Chandler-DunbarCo. and Green Bfay & M. C. Co. v. Patten Paper
Co. 10 4 demonstrated that this act is within the orbit of federal power.
In New Jersey v. Sargent 10 5 the state sought to enjoin the enforcement
of the Power Act in so far as it interfered with control by the state of power
projects located within its borders. The court refused to pass judgment
on the clauses involved on the ground that the petitioner had failed to show
any present interference with state operations. Hence no actual controversy
had arisen between the two governments regarding any "right, privilege, immunity or duty" asserted under a particular federal license. It admonished,
however, that in considering the act one must keep in mind the commerce
clause under which federal power for the improvement of interstate navigation is superior to state authority.
In 1930 the State of Missouri 100 attempted to enjoin the giant Osage

River hydro-electric project at Bagnell Dam which, it alleged, was being
CONSTrruT ON, Art. 4, Sec. 3, cl. 2.
'mU. S.KERwIN,
op.. cit. supra note I, at 284. Cf. Shields, The Federal Power Act
-mSee
(1924) 73 U. OF PA. L. Ry. 142.

a1 Alabama Power Co. v. Gulf Power Co., 283 Fed. 6o6 (M. D. Ala. 1922).
"' Supra notes 75 and 74.
'm269 U. S. 328, 46 Sup. Ct. 122 (1926)."

'mMissouri ex rel. v. Union Elec. Lt. & P. Co., 42 F. (2d) 692, 695, (C. D. Mo. i93o).
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erected for the sole purpose of generating electricity for profit. Backwater
from the dam would inevitably overflow public roads, school districts and
the county seat of Camden County. The submergence would extend for a
distance of one hundred miles, would divide Camden County into three segments each inaccessible to the others, inundate its jail and courthouse, destroy
rich farm lands which were the chief taxable assets of the county, and would
produce unsanitary conditions. Although the Osage River and its tributaries were navigable, of late years the volume of river traffic was negligible
and seasonable. The court admitted that if the dam should be constructed
"for the prime and sole purpose of generating electricity for commercial
purposes, and not for its influence upon navigation, then the subject-matter
would not be within the power of the Congress or within the jurisdiction of
this court." However, it found that navigation would be extensively benefited. And since the degree of necessity was within the legislative discretion
as distinguished from judicial cognizance, the means were appropriate, and
the jurisdiction of Congress over interstate navigation was well established,
a ruling against the injunction followed.
Thus the doctrine of Gibbons v. Ogden progresses, for if determining
the necessity of a project is a congressional prerogative, it seems difficult
to foretell where a court will apply the dictum in Kaukauna Water Power
Co. v. Green Bay & M. C. Co.10 7 and hold that the erection of a dam is a
"colorable device for creating a water power." If this theory is maintained,
the size of a dam will come to be as insignificant a factor as the size of a
power plant seems to be when no dam is involved, and when the function
of a federal license is that of protecting a present commerce rather than
encouraging an improvement of navigation. Certainly the prospect of increased navigability of the Osage River loses its significance in the public
mind in view of the electric service to be supplied to two large cities and
several hundred miles of territory.10 8
IV

Control over innavigable streams is complicated in the west by the presence of vast areas of public lands. Before statehood both legal ownership
and political control of these tracts were in the federal government. The
decisions leave somewhat in doubt the extent to which political power over
this property was surrendered when states were created. The doctrine of
prior appropriation of water-rights, adopted in some of these newer states,
has received the sanction of both Congress and the Supreme Court. 0 9
-°'Supra note 72. The point was passed over in the Ford case, supra note 77.
According to an account which appeared in The New York Times, March 22, 1931, at
E5, 400,000,000 kv.-hrs. of power will be generated annually and supplied to Kansas City, 121
miles away, to St. Louis, 136 miles distant, and to various mines.
"W14 STAT. 251 (1868), 30 U. S. C. A. §43 (1927), Act of July 26, 1866; 16 STAT. 217
(870), 30 U. S. C. A. §35 (1927), Act of July 9, 1870; I9 STAT. 377 (1877), 43 U. S. C. A.
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But there are limitations to state power. One of these is imposed by the
commerce clause. Another is that "in the absence of a specific authority
from Congress a state cannot by its legislation destroy the right of the
United States, as the owner of lands bordering on a stream, to the continued
flow of its waters; so far at least as may be necessary for the beneficial
uses of the government property." 110
The connotations of this dictum are abundant. Federal authority under
the territory and property clause 111 has been held sufficient to justify the
reservation of waters from an innavigable stream for the benefit of an
Indian Reservation, and to exempt them from appropriation under state
law. 1 12 It probably likewise justifies the establishment of the Reclamation
Act of 19o2.1"

But does it support the theory that federal as distinguished

from state law governs water-rights in innavigable streams located on public lands?
The western states are not in agreement. According to the "California" doctrine "14 the extent to which the federal government has recognized local customs and state law as controlling rights secured in the national domain has been purely a matter of acquiescence, ratified by the Acts
of 1866 and 187o. 11 Plenary power remains intact. Legal interests in
public land or water are derived from the government as proprietary owner
rather than from the states as political sovereigns. On the other hand
priority states contend that their sovereignty extends to all the waters within
their borders. Such provisions are contained in state constitutions."The "California" doctrine was advanced by federal attorneys in Wyoming v. Colorado,11' in which case the government appeared as an intervener. The court did not deem it necessary to pass on the point. It decided,
§ 32r (1928), Act of Mar. 3, 1877; Broder v. Water Co., iox U. S. 274 (1879) ; United
States v. Rio Grande Irrigation Co., 174 U. S. 690, 702-706, i9 Sup. Ct 770, 774-776 (1898) ;
Gutierres v. Albuquerque Land & Irrigation Co., 188 U. S. 545, 552-554, 23 Sup. Ct. 338,
341 (i9o2) ; Clark v. Nash, 198 U. S. 36I, 370, 25 Sup. Ct. 676, 679 (i9o5) ; Kansas v. Colorado, 2o6 U. S. 46, 27 Sup. Ct. 655 (igo6) ; Boquillas Land & Cattle Co. v. Curtis, 213 U. S.
339, 29 Sup. Ct. 493 (19o9) ; Los Angeles Farming & Milling Co. v. City of Los Angeles,
217 U. S. 217, 30 Sup. Ct. 452 (igio) ; Snyder v. Colorado Gold Dredging Co., 181 Fed. 62
(C. C. A. 8th, i9io).
m United States v. Rio Grande Irrigation Co., supra note 1O9, at 703, I9 Sup. Ct. at 775.
' See United States v. Gratiot, 14 Pet. 526, 537 (U. S. I84O).
'Winters
v. U. S., supra note 93, citing United States v. Rio Grande Irrigation Co.,
supra note 1o9, and United States v. Winans, supra note 93.
' United States v. Hanson, 167 Fed. 881 (C. C. A. 9th, 19o9) ; Burley v. United States,
179 Fed. i (C. C. A. 9th, gio).
'Lux v. Haggin, 69 Cal. 255, 1o Pac. 674 (1886) ; Hough v. Porter, 51 Ore. 318, 95
Pac. 532 (19o9) ; Willey v. Decker, ii Wyo. 496, 514, 73 Pac. 210, 214 (19o3) ; Sheppard,
The Question of Federal Disposition of State Waters in the Priority States (1914) 28 HAv.
L. REV. 270; Niles, The Swing-Johnson Bill and the Supreme Court (1930) 3 RocKy M. L.
REv. I, 18; OLSo,, op. cit. supra note 94, at i18-I24; LoNG, IRRiGAnioN § 74.
Supra note 1O9.
Colorado Constitution, art. xvi, § 5; Wyoming Constitution, art. 1, § 31.
n7259 U. S. 419, 444-455, 465, 42 Sup. Ct. 552, 557 (1921)See also United States v.
Rio Grande Irrigation Co., supra note 1O9, at 702, 703.
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though, that as between two states which had adopted the theory of priority
as a part of their constitutions, that doctrine should prevail-to prevent
upper riparian owners in one state from diverting the waters of an inavigable stream to another water-shed, whereby depriving lower riparian owners
in the other state of their prior appropriations. In decreeing thus the court
expressly denied imposing "a policy of its own choosing on either state."
In Kansas v. Colorado 11- federal attorneys made the more pretentious
argument that as an incident to sovereignty the federal government should
have plenary power to administer "and control . .irrigation on interstate
streams." But the court thought differently, and held that however desirable federal reclamation of arid lands might be, this was not among the
enumerated powers. Although under the property and territory clause the
government could make "all needful rules and regulations", it could not
"override state laws in respect to the general subject of reclamation. While
arid lands are to be found mainly if not only in the Western and newer
States, yet the powers of the National Government within the limits of those
states are the same (no greater and no less) than those within the limits
of the original thirteen, and it would be strange if, in the absence of a definite grant of power, the National Government could enter the territory of
the states along the Atlantic and legislate in respect to improving by irriga-.
tion or otherwise the lands within their borders. Nor do we understand
that hitherto Congress has acted in disregard to this limitation."
That such humility presages little in a contest between the state and
the federal government as to control of a federal water-power project located on government land, was shown in the recent case of State of Arizona
v.State of California et al.," 9 which involved the constitutionality of the
Boulder Dam Project Act. Here again the court had an opportunity to
express its attitude toward the vastly increasing intervention of the federal
government in irrigation and power projects. The grounds for federal
action though individually tenuous were multiple. The interstate compact
by which all of the interested states except Arizona protected their water
- °
rights in the Colorado River called for federal indorsement. 20
The dam
was to be located on federal property. Irrigation of public land was involved. Flood control was of serious importance.1 21 The history of a
former sporadic and necessarily limited use of the river for transportation
purposes when railroads and highways were largely undeveloped, availed to
augment the possibilities of federal control for the improvement of inter- Supra note iog, at 66, 69, 92, 27 Sup. Ct. at 665. See Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 51
Sup. Ct. 286 ('93').
2"283 U. S. 423, 454, 51 Sup. Ct. 522, 526 (1931).
'See
Niles, op. cit. supra note 114; OLSON, op. cit. supra note 94.
For argument in support of public land reclamation, see brief of Colorado, New Mexico and Nevada in support of motion to dismiss, p. 15. The destruction of transcontinental
railroads was advanced in the reply brief of California, p. ii.
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state commerce. Extra-legal issues concerned the advisability of federal
construction of a regional irrigation and hydro-electric project, too intricate
for states to handle by themselves.
The federal government did not comply with an Arizona statute which
required written approval by certain state officials before any dam could
be erected within the state. Although the statute specifically applied to
constructions by the federal government, the Supreme Court held that the
United States was not bound by it. The holding was rendered upon a motion
to dismiss a bill for an injunction, which was alleged to admit the averment
that the Colorado River was not navigable in fact. The court brushed this
argument aside and took judicial notice of the navigable character of the
river.
The bill further alleged that the "recital in said act that the purpose
thereof is the improvement of navigation is a mere subterfuge and false
pretense", and that the main purpose for the construction is to use the
waters of the river for agriculture and power purposes. To this the court
answered: "Into the motives which induced members of Congress to enact
the Boulder Canyon Project Act this court may not inquire .

. The act

declares that the authority to construct the dam and reservoir is conferred
among other things, for the purpose of 'improving navigation and regulating
the flow of the river.' As the river is navigable and the means which the
act provides are not unrelated to the control of navigation . . . the erec-

tion and maintenance of such dam and reservoir are clearly within the powers
conferred upon Congress. Whether the particular structures proposed are
reasonably necessary is not for this court to determine .

.

.

And the fact

that purposes other than navigation will also be served could not invalidate
the exercise of the authority conferred, even if those other purposes would
not alone have justified an exercise of congressional power." The court
found "no occasion for determining now Arizona's rights to interstate or
local waters which have not yet been, and which may never be, appropriated."
The opinion strains the dictum in the Green Bay case. 122 Or does it
completely ignore it? Size is imperative. Silt which annually washes down
the Colorado in thousands of cubic feet, will be intercepted. A dam of ordinary size would soon be useless. But not this leviathan. Its service is assured for at least three hundred years. 123 There is economy in size, and
practical necessity. Navigation will be benefited for many generations"'

Supra note 72.

2*3"It is estimated that each year enough silt is carried by the waters of the Colorado to
cover a six hundred and forty acre farm to the depth of one hundred thirty-seven feet."
OLsoN, op. cit. supra note 94, at 3. The rate is approximated at 137,ooo acre feet per year
in the brief of the Secretary of the Interior, in support of the motion to dismiss, p. 29; while
at p. 54 it is estimated that "more than 3o0 years would be required to fill the entire reservoir"
with silt.
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and irrigation and electrical generation will be made possible. Of what
effect is a dictum when the motives of Congress will not be investigated?
In addition to the cases which have been discussed, two others have a
bearing on the legality of western private hydro-electric projects. In United
States v. Rio Grande Co. 12 4 the federal government successfully enjoined
the erection of a dam in an innavigable portion of the Rio Grande River
because of the effect which a contemplated diversion of water for irrigation at that point would have on navigation in the lower portion of the river.
And in United States v. Central Stockholders Corp. of Vallejo 125 the government sought to enjoin actions brought by the defendants in a California
state court, to restrain a federal licensee from impounding water in a
reservoir located miles above navigation in the Sierra Nevada Mountains
at the head-waters of the San Joaquin River. The federal bill was dismissed
the court observing: "It will be noticed in this connection that there is rail
transportation generally available in the San Joaquin Valley, as well as a
great system of paved highways leading to different points of the state. The
contention that the erection of storage dams in the mountains is, or was intended to be, in aid of navigation seems to be contradicted by the facts
alleged and shown. Such dams, in the results of their operation, cannot,
in the view I take of the case, have a 'real or substantial relation to the control of navigation'."
It is true that in the Osage case 126 the river was navigable in fact at
the dam site. The court there refused- to consider the degree of necessity
for improving existing navigability. In the Rio Grande and Vallejo
cases the effect on navigation of projects located in the upper and innavigable
reaches of rivers, had first to be established before the federal government
would have jurisdiction. If the objective and realistic reasoning of the
Vallejo case had been applied in the Osage case, the principal purpose for
which the license was granted could not have been suppressed. However,
in view of justice Brandeis' opinion in the Boulder Dam case, as long as
the avowed purpose of Congress is "not unrelated to the control of navigation", the chief objective for licensing or erecting a dam seems to be an
insignificant factor in determining the constitutionality of a desirable
to legal tests, there
project. When. a river is clearly navigable according
2
seems to be little left of the Green Bay dictum.1 1
In the Vallejo case large acreages in a semi-arid climate were being
deprived of beneficent flood waters because of a dam erected for hydroelectric purposes, and navigation was improved by the reservoir incidentally
I' Supra note iog. As to jurisdiction of the Fed. Power Com. over projects located on
193o, Sept. 22, 1930.

innavigable streams, see Ops. ATry. GEN., July I,
43 F. (2d) 977, 98o (N. D, Tex. 1930).
Supra,note io6.

'

Supra note 72.

'_'
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if at all. In the Osage case, a gigantic industrial project was at stake. In
the Boulder Dam case a single dissenting state stood in the way of a vast
reclamation project. But it is just such conflicting interests which create
constitutional law.
V
Government control over super-power reaches its second phase upon
the generation of electricity, but the distribution of control remains a problem between state and federal governments. Through the device of definition electricity has been included within the orbit of interstate commerce,
first as a means of sending telegraph messages 128 and later as a commerce
1
of electric power.

29

Such a process of definition yields to the central government a direct
interest in an ever increasing amount of electrical business. In 1926 of
the 68,I45,217,ooo kw.-hrs. which were generated in the United States,

6,171,53o,837 kw.-hrs. or 9.06 per cent. were transmitted between states.
Of these, 72 per cent. were among fourteen states. An additional 1,127,073,792 kw.-hrs. crossed the Canadian and Mexican borders, making a total
of 7,298,604,63o kw.-hrs. of international or interstate transmission in which
the government was potentially interested under the commerce clause.' 30
The inclusion of power transmission within the concept of commerce
has the additional value of analogizing the scope of the federal control in
gas and oil cases to this field of utility service. A consideration of a group
of these cases is illustrative. In 1907 the legislature of Oklahoma I'l
attempted to prevent the exporting of natural gas. The construction of
pipe lines was limited to local corporations on the condition that they would
not export gas nor sell to other corporations or persons "engaged in transporting or furnishing natural gas to points, places or persons outside of this
state." The power of eminent domain and the use of the highways were
restricted to such local corporations. The motive for the legislation was
clearly to preserve the natural wealth of the state for home consumption.
However, in a consolidated action brought by certain individuals and foreign corporations to test the constitutionality of the act,' 3

2

this objective

' Pensacola Tel. Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 96 U. S. i (877);
Western Union
Tel. Co. v. Foster, 247 U. S. 105, 38 Sup. Ct. 438 (1917).
' Public Util. Corn. v. Attleboro, 273 U. S. 83, 47 Sup. Ct 294 (1926).

'" Bulletin No. 68 of the Bureau of Business Research of Harvard University. "The
percentage of generated power exported from Alabama is 25 per cent., from South Carolina
31 per cent., from Georgia 38 per cent., from West Virginia 43 per cent., from Iowa 48 per
cent., from Idaho 63 per cent., and from Vermont 94 per, cent. The. percentage relation of
power imported to power generated within the state is 29 per cent. in North Carolina, 37 per
cent. in Arkansas, 38 per cent. in Rhode Island, 40 per cent in Kentucky, 75 per cent. in
Maryland, 98 per cent. in Mississippi, "16 per cent. in Missouri, 121 per cent. in Utah, and
126 per cent. in Nevada."
FEDERAL POwER Comm. ANN. REP. 1928, at 13.
' Session Laws of i9o7, c. 67.
Oklahoma -v. Kansas Nat. Gas-Co., 221 U. S.

229, 255, 31

Sup. Ct. 564, 571 (I911).

CONTROL OF SUPER-POWER

did not meet with sympathetic reception by the majority of the Supreme
Court. They saw in such a provincial policy a precedent for Pennsylvania
to appropriate its coal supply, "the Northwest its timber, and the mining
states their minerals." The opinion distinguished between legislation intended to prevent the waste of natural gas, and this which sought to restrict
the market where an owner of private property might vend it. Once gas
was reduced to possession it was likened to a chattel. The court held that
the statute was unconstitutional in its efforts to prevent foreign corporations
from exporting gas, and in unfairly discriminating against them by forbidding their crossing highways, since local corporations engaged in intrastate
sale of gas might do so. A previous holding of the court 133 which sustained the power of a state to prevent the exportation of fresh water was
explained on the basis of the limited common-law interests of a riparian
owner.
A different phase of the problem of preferring home consumers was
litigated by the states of Pennsylvania and Ohio 134 in an action to enjoin
the enforcement by West Virginia of a statute which required that all gas
companies within the state must meet local demands for gas regardless of
their commitments elsewhere. Large investments of capital were involved
and a vast business was endangered. As a consequence the law was held
to impose too great a burden on interstate commerce despite the succinct dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Holmes to the effect that a state should be
able to regulate the sale of gas before it becomes a part of an interstate
stream, and to give "a preference to its inhabitants in the enjoyment of its
natural advantages."
In both of these cases the choice lay between state individualism and
a phase of economic nationalism. To this end Mr. Justice Holmes' analogies
to the power of a state to prevent the sale of unripe citrus fruit ultimately
destined for interstate commerce, and to the constitutionality of state game
laws, although technically skilful are not convincing unless one agrees with
him in the policy of state isolation. In his concurring dissent in the West
Virginia case Mr. Justice Brandeis offered the enormity of the task of
allocating the equitable disposition of West Virginia gas among the six
states which were then using it, as a cogent reason for the court refusing
to provide an equitable disposition. Granting the practicality of the argument, it might still be sounder to solve the enigma by allowing the producers
to seek a national market on the basis of economic return, than by artificially
preferring the people of a state thus naturally endowed to those in states
less fortunately blessed.
County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U. S. 349, 28 Sup. Ct. 529 (1907).
Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, Ohio v. West Virginia, 262 U. S. 553, 602, 43 Sup. Ct.
658, 667 (1922).
1HHudson
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The illiberal view which Mr. Smith, then governor of New York,
expressed in 1923 on the subject of local consumption of hydro-electric
power 181 to be produced on the St. Lawrence, met with a rejoinder in the
broader vision of Governor Pinchot of Pennsylvania. In a letter to Mr.
Smith, Governor Pinchot outlined his aim for "giant power" to transcend
state lines, and called upon New York to share its water-power with the fuel
power generated at Pennsylvania mines.1 3 A similar local policy in Maine
which seeks to draw industries into the state by preventing the exportation
of hydro-electricity is equally objectionable.'"
Dual control of interstate transmission of electricity led to an allocation by the Supreme Court of zones within which states may determine
rates of sale. As hitherto, the precedents came from the analogous field of
natural gas cases. Experience with railroad litigation was also available.
In 1918 the receiver of the Kansas Natural Gas Company 13 s obtained an
injunction against the Kansas Public Utilities Commission restraining it from
establishing rates of sale to consumers of gas supplied by his corporation.
The gas was chiefly imported from Oklahoma and was sold to local distributing companies on the basis of two-thirds the gross receipts from consumers. The court reversed the ruling for the reason that the "interstate
movement ended when the gas passed into local mains." The state commission, therefore, had power to establish rates to consumers.
This avenue of escape was not available in Pennsylvania Gas Co. v.
Public Serzice Commission 1'9 wherein a Pennsylvania company exported
gas a distance of about fifty miles from its source of supply in that state,
and sold direct to consumers in New York state. Clearly this was interstate commerce in light of all precedents. However, relying upon the Minnesota rate cases 140 the court held that the New York Public Service Commission had jurisdiction to establish rates to consumers. Local interest was
domain,
considered a sufficient basis for transgressing upon the federal
41
acted.1
not
had
government
central
the
instance
this
since in
am credibly advised that a strong and determined propaganda is now being spread
""'I
in support bf a plan to divert the electrical energy from our border streams to territory out-

side the state. This we must resist with all the power we can bring to our command."
Quoted froi-a message to the New York legislature in KnwIx, op. ct supra note I, at 285.
"Such a system must transcend state lines and is likely to become nation wide. The
new art of electric transmission is already so developed that the giant power system with
which we are immediately concerned should now include all power producers and consumers
in the northern section of the United States and should perhaps draw upon resources of
water power in Canada." Letter from Governor Pinchot to Governor Smith, quoted in naEWIN, ibid. 287.
REv. STAT. (i930) c. 28, §§ I and 2. See editorial in ELEcr ucAL Racoan, April
'1 MM
1923, P. 201.
Public Otil. Com. v. Landon, 249 U. S. 236, 242, 245, 39 Sup. Ct. 268, 269 (1918).

252 U. S. 23, 40 Sup. Ct. 279 (1919). And see Mill Creek Coal & Coke Co. v. Public
Service Commission, 84 W. Va. 662, ioo S. E. 557 (1919) (electricity).
U0230 U. S. 352, 33 Sup. Ct. 729 (1912).

' "This local service is not of that character which requires general and uniform regulation of rates by congressional action; and which has always been held beygnd the power of
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These two cases were later supported in Missouri v. Kansas Gas Co.142
wherein the court denied to the Kansas Commission power to determine
rates at which importing companies might sell to local distributing companies. The absence of federal supervision was not considered to be an
invitation for local control. The burden on interstate commerce was direct
in this case, not indirect and local as in the preceding ones.
With the decisions in these natural gas cases the pioneering was performed and the way cleared for the Attleboro case.14 3 The Narragansett
Electric Lighting Company of Rhode Island was engaged in the manufacture and sale of electricity. About three per cent. of its output was delivered under a twenty-year contract to the Attleboro Company for distribution
in Massachusetts. The Rhode Island Commission found that the rates
charged in this comparatively small contract were proportionally too low,
and so worked a hardship on Rhode Island customers of the Narragansett
Company. To avert the local injury the Commission raised the rates to the
Attleboro Company on the theory that this was primarily a matter of local
concern in which the federal government should not interfere. It was an
effort to carry the doctrine of the Pennsylvania Gas case a step further than
the majority of the Supreme Court would permit. Although the sale of
electricity took place at the state line, it was not contended that this altered
the interstate character of the transaction; 144 nor was it denied that the
transmission of electricity from one state to another was interstate commerce. Neither Massachusetts nor Rhode Island had jurisdiction of such
a contract.
The doctrine of these cases renders it less necessary for the federal
government to enter the field of interstate rate-making in the sale of electric 145 current than in the railroad service. In the latter the carriers deal
directly with the consumers throughout the country and a national interest
is at stake. In the former, state control of distributing companies, whether
themselves producers or merely distributers of current, potentially at least,
offers a solution for governmental supervision.146 Prices to consumers of
the States, although Congress has not legislated upon the subject. While the manner in
which the business is conducted is part of interstate commerce, its regulation in the distribution of gas to the local consumers is required in the public interest and has not been attempted
under the superior authority of Congress." Pennsylvania Gas case, supra note 139, at 31.
1&2265 U. S. 298, 44 Sup. Ct. 544 (1923). See also United States Fuel Gas Co. v. Hallanan, 257 U. S. 277, 42 Sup. Ct. 9 (1921) ; Peoples Gas Co. v. Public Service Comm., 270
U. S. 550, 46 Sup. Ct. 371 (1925).

Supra note 129.
See Peoples Gas Co. v. Public Service Comm., supra note 142.
"It seems clear, therefore, that Congress thought of the control of electric utilities as
a local problem and that the imposition of a superior authority would be needed only in the
event of disputes between states. Doubtless it was recognized that electric power must of
necessity be used in the immediate vicinity of its production and that its transportation lacks
the complicated interstate relations affecting large groups of states, as in the case of railroad
transportation. Being a; local problem it was considered that its control might best be attended by local responsibility and local opinion." FED. PoWER ComM . ANr. REP. 1929, at 5,6.
' See editorial comment in (1929) 19 NAT. MUN. REv. 155 to the effect that unless public utility regulation improves public ownership threatens.
',"
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electricity as of gas depend upon local conditions which require considerable
particularity. Yet the refusal of the federal government to regulate interstate rate contracts of carrying companies, and of the courts to permit states
to do so, leaves a growing field within which there is no effective supervision,
and where the industry is left to the precarious device of self-discipline. 147
Should centralized control of interstate rate-making ever be decreed
for electrical manufacturers, greater inroads will probably be made into
state jurisdiction. The rule of the Pennsylvania Gas case may be repudiated.
Intrastate rates which have a deleterious bearing on interstate ones will
probably be sacrificed on an analogy to the Shreveport rate case.' 48
Another potential incursion into state control of electric rates lies in
the federal jurisdiction of hydro-electric projects situated on navigable
streams. The Federal Power Act 149 requires as a condition to granting a
license, that as long as the state in which the licensee operates has no commission or agency for local control, it shall submit to federal supervision
of intrastate as well as of interstate rates and service. Such is the tortuous
course of the commerce clause. The reservation in favor of state juris1

"Under a multitude of Supreme Court decisions, the states have no power to regulate,
prohibit or burden directly the transmission of property like gas, oil and electricity between
the states, or to disturb such inter-state commerce by regulation of rates or prices, except by
the clumsy device of compacts between the states. ..
"The railroads, pipe lines, telegraph, telephone and radio service, airships, buses and
trucks are lawfully subject to Federal control when engaged in interstate business. The
water-power development of our streams is covered by the Federal power act.
"But the interstate transmission of electric power, though growing by leaps and bounds
in magnitude and importance, is still in the twilight zone in which the states are unable to
assume control, while the Federal power although it has been asserted, has not yet been exercised. Interstate commerce in electric current is still outside of either state or Federal control. "The
Federal Trade Commission reports that in 1928
the electric current moving over
946 crossings of state boundaries by electric transmission lines amounted to 14,SOO,OOO,ooo
kilowatt hours. The National Electric Association reports in round numbers 6,171,oo
kilowatt hours so crossing in 1926, 8,92o,ooo,ooo in 1928 and io,856,oooooo in 1929.
"If we accept these lower figures, the actual interstate movement of electric power has
increased more than 75 per cent. in the three-year period from x92q to 1929, and its relative
importance to the total power consumption of the country more than 31 per cent. In certain
states today imported current amounts to from one-half to three-quarters of the local consumption...
"I wish to express my firm conviction based on no little practical experience, that the
question of the public utilities cannot be settled by the individual states acting alone; that the
effort to settle it by individual states acting alone is hopeless from the start; that the problem
is essentially national in its character and that it can be solved only under the leadership and
by the action of the Nation itself, assisted and supported, of course, by the co-ordinated action
of the individual states." Governor Pinchot's address at the Governors' Conference, June 2,
1931, reported in The New York Times, June 3, 1931, at I, 2.
"The jurisdiction of the Federal Power Commission in cases of interstate transmission
of power by its licensees, their subsidiaries or customers, may be invoked 'upon complaint of
any person aggrieved' or 'upon the request of any state concerned'; or the commission may
act on its own initiative. No complaint of any person has yet been filed;..."
"'hile the commission is given authority to initiate action under the provisions of section
19, the volume of other' work requiring its attention would hardly permit of its taking the
initiative, even if such a procedure were advisable." FED. Pow n COmM. ANN. REP. 1928.
at II, 12.
"

8

Houston & Texas Ry. v. United States, 234 U. S. 342, 34 Sup. Ct 833 (913).

see United States v. Hubbard, 266 U. S. 474, 45 Sup. Ct. i6o (1925).
141
STAT. 1073, 19 (1921), i6 U. S. C. A. §812 et seq. (1927).

And
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diction when a proper body for that purpose has been organized, may avoid
a present clash of state and federal governments over the ultimate location
of power.' 50 However, if the courts should sustain this extension of federal supervision as a condition to granting a license, it is difficult to see why
the existence or non-existence of state activity in the field should qualify
the scope of such federal power. It would certainly be contrary to the
analogous theory that although the federal government is silent, a state
may not regulate purely interstate rates of gas or electricity. 1 ' Yet if the
federal power should be recognized but not be so qualified, the future
usurpation of this field of utility supervision would be limited only by con52
gressional volition.1
VI
The steady trend toward centralization which has accompanied the development of nation-wide business is not a matter of conjecture.' 5 3 The
portend of future usurpation of state power and the means by which it may
be accomplished are obvious from a study of the judicial technique employed
in the past. We have always had a certain amount of governmental supervision of power generation. The shift has been more from state to federal control than from laissez faire to paternalism. Each generation has
announced a new political synthesis for which it has found constitutional
sanction, but which has really been an adaptation of the Constitution to
changing conceptions of economic, political and social needs.
. In 1787 American business was as provincial as the thirteen isolated
communities which were struggling to amalgamate into a firmer federation.
The problems which confronted the American pioneer statesmen who
drafted the Constitution were necessarily contemporaneous, and gifted
vision could not possibly have anticipated the trenchant demands which
growth and change would levy. Nor could any formal utterance suffice to
guide future generations. The form of the Constitution remains but the
10 See letters of Mr. Hughes and Mr. Merrill, op. cit. spra note 96.

' See Missouri v. Kansas Gas Co., supro note i42, and Public Util. Coin. v. Attleboro,

supra note 129.
""For an interesting survey of the electric-power industry see REPoRT OF
PowER INDUSTRY (927) by the U. S. Fed. Trade Comm.

TH-

ETcraic-

10 "Many will regret the Federalist tendencies of these judicial pronouncements. Many
will regret that economic tendencies take no heed of state lines, that our Federal Union becomes less federal each decade, that our local governments are losing vitality, that our Constitution is becoming grotesquely bent to fit new situations; yet, the sober fact remains that
the well-being of the people demands that we adapt ourselves and our institutions to the
newer tendencies." KzawIN, op. cit. supra note i, at io2.
"This extension of federal activities has not come about because of a disregard for the
rights of the states or because of desire on the part of the central government to usurp. A
centralized control over a number of activities has been made necessary because of the complexities of modem life. It is now largely interstate. Consequently in the exercise of its
powers conferred by the commerce clause the federal government regulates a greater number of activities." THomPso, FEDERAL CENTRALIZATION 331.
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plasticity of its words has offered the solution. Its elemental tenets are
constantly being metamorphosed in an endeavor to preserve the fabric but
warp the design to meet the needs of the unforeseen.
Nowhere is this growth more clearly exposed than in the application
of the commerce clause to the erection of a power dam on an inland watercourse. It is a reality little dreamed of in 1787 when such control was
purely local. The problem of licensing a Massachusetts grist mill has become that of assuaging an indignant state in the erection of a Boulder Dam.
The course may have been via a Fulton steamer, the Wheeling Bridge, and
a canal on the Fox River, but it has been constantly onward. If the Federal Power Act continues to be circumspectly administered, can its constitutionality be doubted today?' 5 4
It is academic to speculate what the framers of the Constitution would
have done had super-power control been a national issue when the government was formed, or if Chief Justice Marshall had sat in a case involving
an interstate power project on an innavigable intrastate stream. However,
one is tempted to such contemplation since it is Marshall, or probably more
accurately Webster, whom we must credit with choosing the commerce
clause as the dialectical foundation in Gibbons v. Ogden. There were
greater possibilities in the maritime clause. Had sentiment desired and
fortuitous events dictated the selection of that clause as the basis for expansion of central Control over inland waters, federal jurisdiction over superpower might have been broader than it is today. National needs have caused
the extension of maritime control far inland and have divorced it from the
taint of the sea, yet it retains in its new form the limiting test of "navigability in fact," and because of its association with commerce, an interstate
flavor which is exotic.
There was nothing sacrosanct about such limitations. If nationally
minded men had early envisaged conservation and control of water-power
as a federal function, power development could have been defined as maritime as is bridge-control, and admiralty jurisdiction could have been extended to innavigable streams as easily as to navigable ones. But agitation
for federal conservation of water-power sources came after the law had
crystallized. So we are told that an electrical project, which does not materially affect navigation, located on the innavigable upper waters of a
Sierra Nevada stream, is beyond the federal province. It is much a matter
of history, or perhaps of constitutional behaviorism expressed as biological
growth.
Control over sources of hydro-electric generation although only partially allocated to the federal government, is in itself quite substantial. In
1930 of the 42,816,213 hp. installed capacity of stations in public utility
'"Cf. Shields,

op. cit. supra note

io2.
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service, 11,144,233 hp. were devoted to water-power generation, and 31,-

671,98o hp. to fuel power. The total capacity of plants operating tinder
federal license was 2,6o8,868 hp. which constituted about 24 per cent. of
the total capacity.155 However, the distribution of water-power sources is
not uniform. About two-thirds of them are located in the eleven Rocky
Mountain and Pacific Coast states, which consume I73 per cent. of the total
electric production, while the central states, which consume 38 per cent. of
the gross output, have about I i per cent. of the potential water-power. 15 6
This disparity between demand and supply turns many manufacturers to
157
the use of fuel power.

Where federal control of electrical power will end is more a question
of predicting trends of political theory than of interpreting constitutional
phrases. It is in this light that the occasional rebuff which courts have
accorded federal expansion of jurisdiction over rivers and power sources,
is readily explained. The decisions have contained little that was inevitable,
except when the words of the Constitution have been too plain to admit of
explanation. The language of the courts has been conciliatory toward
the states. The tone of the annual reports of the Federal Power Commission is one of state solicitude. 5 " When one remembers that, starting with
Gibbons v. Ogden, the entire process of constitutional interpretation of
federal power over inland waters has consisted in the usurpation of what
had hitherto been a state function, and that the local exigencies of many
problems still advise a reliance upon state administration, this compromising attitude is understandable.
Federal activity has advanced further in the control of hydro-generation of electricity than in the regulation of interstate transmission. In the
latter field the government has been content to mark out the spheres for state
jurisdiction. While it jealously asserts the existence of federal power, it
refuses to prescribe interstate rates or to permit the states to- do so. Yet,
save in cases of clear violation of prerogative, state supervision is courted.
Slight interference is even tolerated. Should the future dictate the use of
PowER Comm. ANN. REP. 1930, at 5, 6. "It is of interest to note that about 8o
'1 F1a.
per cent. of all the capacity operating under Federal Power Commission license is confined to
four states-Alabama, California, Maryland, and New York. . . . The installations in a
dozen states comprise )7 per cent. of the total and in 27 states there are no plants whatever
operating under the authorization of the act. It is apparent from these figures that the effect
of the legislation so far has been of somewhat sectional rather than broad national significance." Ibid. 5.
10 FED. PoWER Comm. ANN. REP. i929, at 3.
7"Another factor of far-reaching importance affecting water-power development is the
improvement of steam-plant design. . . . With the most favorable water-power sites already in service it is obvious that new projects must undergo the most critical comparison
with equivalent steam capacity, particularly in regions where cheap fuel supplies are avail-

able." Ibid. at 3, 4.

- See Fan. PowER Comm. ANN. REP. 1927, at 2-7; FE.
at 7-14.

PowER Comm. ANN. RaP. 1928,
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interstate pacts as the solution for super-power control, 159 whether of state
or privately owned projects, the benevolent hand of the federal government
will doubtless be seen in its favorite paternal capacity-that of offering
authoritative assistance, but not of usurping state initiative.1 60 If, however,
the development of super-power is to remain primarily a function of "big
business", federal control may become more direct. 161 This is in the realm
of speculation, but hardly of constitutional limitation.
' See FED. PoWER Comm. ANN. REP. i925, at i0,to the effect that interstate pacts will
not be used extensively.
' "With various regional pacts agreed to, there might be formed a federation of power
regions supervised by the National Government. In such a case, Congress would have to
assume the responsibility of seeing to it that such interstate agreements were in all respects
in line with the public welfare and would be expected to approve or disapprove such agree-

ments with that idea in view."

' See
133, 137.
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KERWIN, op. cit. supra note I, at 103.
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